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Abstract
What fraction of the single item n buyers setting’s expected optimal revenue (MyeRev) can
the second price auction with reserves achieve? In the special case where the buyers’ valuation
distributions are all drawn i.i.d. and the distributions satisfy the regularity condition, the second
price auction with an anonymous reserve (ASP) is the optimal auction itself. As the setting
gets more complex, there are established upper bounds on the fraction of MyeRev that ASP
can achieve. On the contrary, no such upper bounds are known for the fraction of MyeRev
achievable by the second price auction with eager personalized reserves (ESP). In particular,
no separation was earlier known between ESP’s revenue and MyeRev even in the most general
setting of non-identical product distributions that don’t satisfy the regularity condition. In
this paper we establish the first separation results for ESP: we show that even in the case
of distributions drawn i.i.d., but not necessarily satisfying the regularity condition, the ESP
cannot achieve more than a 0.778 fraction of MyeRev in general. Combined with the result
from Correa et al. (2017) that ESP can achieve at least a 0.745 fraction of MyeRev, this nearly
bridges the gap between upper and lower bounds on ESP’s approximation factor.
1 Introduction
Approximating the optimal auction’s expected revenue MyeRev by simple mechanisms has re-
ceived a lot of attention in the algorithmic game theory literature, especially in the last decade.
The seminal result of Myerson (1981) describes the optimal auction in a single agent n-items set-
ting when buyer valuations are drawn from a product distribution. When the buyer valuation
distributions are independent and identical (i.i.d.) and satisfy a technical regularity condition,
Myerson’s optimal auction coincides with the second price (Vickrey’s) auction with an anonymous
reserve price (ASP). When the setting gets more complex, either because the distributions are not
identical or because the distributions don’t satisfy the regularity condition, or both, ASP ceases
to be the optimal auction. Bounds on the suboptimality are known in many cases:
• when the distributions are non-identical (independent) and irregular, Alaei et al. (2015) show
that ASP cannot get more than a 1n fraction of MyeRev in general, and it is straightforward
to show that this is tight;
• when the distributions are non-identical (independent) and regular, Hartline and Roughgarden
(2009) show that ASP cannot get more than a 12 fraction of MyeRev in general, Alaei et al.
(2015) show that ASP can achieve a 1e fraction of MyeRev in general, and recently Jin et al.
(2019) show that ASP cannot get more than a 12.15 fraction of MyeRev in general;
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• when the distributions are identical (independent) and irregular, the pricing problem can be
reduced to the prophet inequalities problem on ironed virtual values, for which a 12 approxi-
mation via a uniform threshold is known (Samuel-Cahn (1984)). Since the distributions are
identical, the uniform threshold in the ironed virtual value space translates into a uniform
threshold in the value space, thus showing that ASP can achieve a 12 approximation as well.
This approximation factor of ASP is tight, as shown in Hartline (2013), although we will also
provide a self-contained proof here as a corollary.
On the contrary, no upper bounds are known on the fraction of MyeRev obtainable by a second
price auction with personalized reserve prices. When the reserve prices are personalized, it matters
whether the bidders are ranked after eliminating those below the reserve (eager, “ESP”) or before
eliminating those below the reserve (lazy, “LSP”). In the eager version, we first eliminate bidders
below their respective reserves, and then charge the highest surviving bidder (if any) the maximum
of his own reserve price and the second highest surviving bid. In the lazy version, we first decide
the potential winner to be the highest bidder, eliminate him if he doesn’t survive his reserve price
(in which case we allocate the good to nobody), and then if he survives allocate the good to him at
a price of maximum of his reserve price and the second highest bid. Paes Leme et al. (2016) show
that for general correlated distributions, the optimal revenue obtainable from ESP and LSP are
incomparable (i.e. either could be higher on a specific instance), but are within a factor of two.
When the distributions are independent Paes Leme et al. show that the optimal ESP’s revenue
dominates the optimal LSP’s revenue. Therefore from the perspective of upper bounding the
fraction of MyeRev that is obtainable, any result for ESP implies a result for LSP. ESP’s are
also more widely used, and are a more natural auction to run1).
Our result. Our main result (Theorem 2.4) is an upper bound on the maximum fraction of
MyeRev that ESP can obtain. We show that in the n buyers single item setting, even when
the buyer values are drawn i.i.d. (but not necessarily from a regular distribution), the fraction
of MyeRev that ESP can extract in general is at most 0.778. The i.i.d. irregular setting is the
simplest non-trivial setting to consider since, as discussed earlier, the i.i.d. regular setting results
in a 1 approximation from even a second price auction with anonymous reserve price.
Corollary. Our construction can also be modified to show that ASP cannot get more than 12 of
MyeRev for i.i.d. irregular valuations, establishing that the 12 approximation factor for ASP is
tight.
Near tightness of ESP result. A mechanism very related to ESP is the sequential posted
price mechanism (SPM) where the seller computes one price per buyer, and then approaches the
buyers in the descending order of posted prices until the item is sold. In general single-parameter
environments with matroid feasibility constraints (this includes the single item setting we study
as a special case), Chawla et al. (2010) showed the the revenue of an ESP that uses the posted
prices of an SPM as its personalized reserve prices is at least as high as the SPM’s revenue. This,
combined with the recent result of Correa et al. (2017) showing that SPM can achieve a 0.745
fraction of MyeRev in the i.i.d. setting with possibly irregular distributions, shows that ESP can
also achieve at least a 0.745 approximation factor in the i.i.d. setting. Thus, our upper bound of
0.778 on ESP’s approximation factor in the i.i.d. setting is quite close to this lower bound of 0.745.
1For instance, when there is at least one buyer that survives their reserve price, ESP always allocates the item,
whereas LSP could result in no allocation even then.
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In the case of SPM both the upper and lower bound are known to be 0.745: the upper bound of
0.745 for SPMs was established by Hill and Kertz (1982) about 3.5 decades prior to the matching
lower bound established by Correa et al.
ESP vs SPM: the benefit of simultaneity. The primary advantage of ESP over SPM is
that ESP considers all buyers simultaneously while SPM considers buyers sequentially. Thus,
as Chawla et al. (2010) show, ESP should only earn better revenue by benefiting from this simul-
taneity. Our upper bound of 0.778 on the approximation factor of ESP shows that this benefit of
simultaneity is quite small in general, given that SPMs themselves can achieve a 0.745 approxi-
mation. In a sense, our result shows that discrimination is more crucial for revenue maximization
than simultaneity. Closing this gap further, or establishing a separation between SPM and ESP
remains an interesting open problem.
2 Upper bound on ESP approximation factor
We provide an example that establishes the upper bound on ESP’s approximation factor.
Example 2.1. There are n buyers, with n → ∞. Each buyer’s valuation is drawn i.i.d. from a
discrete distribution F where
v ∼ F =


n, w.p. 1/n2
α/β, w.p. β/n − 1/n2
0, w.p. 1− β/n
Here α > 1 and β > 0 are constants to be optimized later to minimize the ratio of MyeRev earned
by ESP (note that since they are constants they don’t scale with n, and therefore β >> 1n and
α < nβ; these are things we use in Lemma 2.2 below).
Lemma 2.2. In a n buyers setting, when the buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the distri-
bution F described in Example 2.1, the expected revenue MyeRev of Myerson’s optimal auction
approaches
1 +
α− 1
β
(1− e−β).
Proof. We compute the revenue as the expected ironed virtual surplus. To compute the latter,
consider the revenue curve R(q) = qF−1(1−q), where in this case F−1(1−q) denotes the maximum
price at which the probability of getting a sale (from a single buyer with valuation drawn from F )
is at least q. It can be computed that
R(q) = qF−1(1− q) =


qn, 0 < q ≤ 1/n2;
qα/β, 1/n2 < q ≤ β/n;
0, β/n < q ≤ 1.
Note that the revenue curve is not concave, because R(1/n2) = 1/n and R(β/n) = α/n > 1/n,
while R(1/n2 + ε) = ( 1
n2
+ ǫ)αβ < 1/n for sufficiently small ε > 0. The ironed revenue curve over
q ∈ [1/n2, β/n] is formed by joining the points (1/n2, 1/n) and (β/n, α/n). The slope of three line
segments in the ironed revenue curve are the ironed virtual values corresponding to the three value
realizations:
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• the slope of the line segment between (0, 0) and (1/n2, 1/n) is n and that is the virtual value
(which is equal to the ironed virtual value for this segment) of buyers with value n;
• the slope of the line segment between (1/n2, 1/n) and (β/n, α/n) is α−1β−1/n and that is the
ironed virtual valuation of buyers with value α/β.
• buyers with value 0 have negative ironed virtual value and are irrelevant for revenue purposes.
The complete description of Myerson’s optimal mechanism here is as follows:
• any buyer who bids below αβ is never allocated, and always pays 0;
• if there are no buyers with bid n or larger: allocate the item to a uniformly random buyer
among all buyers with bids in [αβ , n) and charge him
α
β ;
• if there is exactly one buyer with bid of n or larger, that buyer gets the item with probability
1, and he pays n− (n − αβ ) · 1/(1 + num of buyers with bids in [
α
β , n)) which is basically the
area to the left of the allocation curve of that buyer;
• if there is more than one buyer with bid of n or larger, allocate the item to a uniformly
random buyer among all buyers with bids in [n,∞) and charge him n.
The expected revenue of Myerson’s optimal mechanismMyeRev equals the expected ironed virtual
surplus, which can be computed as follows. With probability 1 − (1 − 1/n2)n, at least one buyer
has virtual valuation n. With probability (1− 1/n2)n − (1− β/n)n, no buyer has virtual valuation
n but at least one buyer has ironed virtual valuation α−1β−1/n . Therefore, the expected ironed virtual
surplus, as the number of buyers approaches ∞, is
lim
n→∞
(
n
(
1− (1−
1
n2
)n
)
+
α− 1
β − 1/n
(
(1−
1
n2
)n − (1−
β
n
)n
))
= 1 +
α− 1
β
(1− e−β),
completing the proof.
Lemma 2.3. In a n buyers setting, when the buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution
F described in Example 2.1, the expected revenue EspRev of ESP as n→∞ is at most
1 +
α− lnα− 1
β
.
Proof. Consider any revenue-maximizing ESP auction. Since the only possible non-zero valuations
are n and α/β, it does not lose generality to assume that all reserve prices are set to either n or
α/β. Let z ∈ {0, 1n ,
2
n , . . . , 1} denote the fraction of buyers whose reserve is set to n, so that the
number of buyers with reserves n and α/β are zn and (1− z)n, respectively.
With probability 1 − (1 − 1
n2
)zn, at least one of the buyers with reserve n clears their reserve
price, and the ESP auction earns the maximum possible revenue of n. Otherwise, all zn buyers
with reserve n are eliminated from the auction and we consider the other buyers.
For the other (1−z)n buyers with reserve α/β, at least one of them will clear their reserve with
probability 1 − (1 − βn)
(1−z)n, in which case the ESP auction is guaranteed to earn at least α/β.
In this case, there is also the possibility of earning the higher revenue of n, if at least two buyers
report a valuation of n. However, the probability of this event is at most
(n
2
)
times the probability
that a given pair of buyers both report n, by the union bound. Therefore, the expected revenue
collected from this event is at most n
(n
2
)
( 1n2 )
2 = O( 1n), and can be ignored as n→∞.
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Collecting the above terms, for any n and z ∈ {0, 1n ,
2
n , . . . , 1}, the expected revenue of the
corresponding ESP auction is
n
(
1− (1−
1
n2
)zn
)
+
α
β
(1−
1
n2
)zn
(
1− (1−
β
n
)(1−z)n
)
≤ n
(
1− (1−
(
zn
1
)
1
n2
)
)
+
α
β
(1)
(
1− e−β(1−z)
)
=z +
α
β
(
1− e−β(1−z)
)
+O(
1
n
) (1)
where we used the binomial theorem in the first inequality. The maximum of the concave function
z + αβ (1 − e
−β(1−z)) over z ∈ [0, 1] is attained at z = 1 − lnαβ , and equals 1 −
lnα
β +
α
β (1 −
1
α),
completing the proof.
Theorem 2.4. Let MyeRev(n,D) and EspRev(n,D) denote respectively the revenue of the op-
timal auction (Myerson’s auction) and the second price auction with personalized reserves in a
single-item setting with n buyers whose values are drawn i.i.d from D. Then:
inf
n,D
EspRev(n,D)
MyeRev(n,D)
< 0.778.
Proof. Consider Example 2.1. By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, the fraction of Myerson’s optimal revenue
earned by an ESP auction in this example is at most
β + α− 1− lnα
β + (α− 1)(1 − e−β)
, (2)
for any values of α > 1 and β > 0. By numerically minimizing over such values of α and β, it can
be checked that when α = 2.91 and β = 1.89, the value of (2) is less than 0.778, completing the
proof.
2.1 Upper bound on ASP approximation factor
Consider the distribution from Example 2.1 with α = β = n and let n → ∞. By Lemma 2.2,
the optimal revenue of Myerson is 1 + n−1n (1 − e
−n) which approaches 2 as n →∞. On the other
hand, ESP must set all of the reserves to either n or 1. By the analysis in Lemma 2.3, this is
upper-bounded by expression (1) with z = 0 or z = 1, i.e. the revenue of ASP is at most
max{1− e−n +O(
1
n
), 1 +O(
1
n
)}
which approaches 1 as n→∞. This completes the proof.
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